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Thus, a tightly financially constrained manager will accept both a lower level of performance-based rewards and a smaller probability of keeping her job after a poor performance, where the probability of turnover is determined by the composition of the board, the presence of takeover defenses, the specification of termination rights (in the case of venture capital or alliance financing) and other contractual arrangements. The heterogeneity in the intensity of financial constraints then predicts a positive comovement of turnover under poor per- formance and low-powered incentives. Implicit and explicit incentives then appear to be complements in the sample.
(Level III Volume 4 Fixed Income and Equity Portfolio Management , 4th Edition. Pearson Learning Solutions p. 304).
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发表于 2011-7-13 13:15
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