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Most large U.S. companies have built into their capital budgeting process a theoretical model that economists are now debating the value of. This is the capital asset pricing model (the CAPM) developed 30 years ago by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965). This model was the first apparently successful attempt to show how to assess the risk of the cash flow from a potential investment project and to estimate the project's cost of capital, the expected rate of return that investors will demand if they are to invest in the project. Until recently, empirical tests of the CAPM supported the model. But in 1992, tests by Fama and French did not; they said, in effect, that the CAPM is useless for precisely what it was developed to do. Since then, researchers have been scrambling to figure out just what's going on. What's wrong with the CAPM? Are the Fama and French results being interpreted too broadly? Must the CAPM be abandoned and a new model developed? Or can the CAPM be modified in some way to make it still a useful tool?[1]

In this article, we don't take sides in the CAPM debate; we merely my to describe the debate accurately. We start by describing the data the CAPM is meant to explain. Then we develop a version of the model and describe bow it measures risk. And finally we describe the results of competing empirical studies of the model's validity.

The article is great!!

but can you post the chart and figure ?

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Coolll!!![em02][em02]

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HOW THE CAPM HELPS CORPORATE MANAGERS

Models like the capital asset pricing model (the CAPM) help corporate managers by providing them with a practical way to learn about how investors judge the riskiness of potential investment opportunities. This helps managers use the sources of their firms more efficiently.

The Manager's Problem

In modern industrial economics, managers don't easily know what the firm's owners want them to do. Ownership and management are typically, quite separate. Managers are hired to act in the interests of owners, who bold stock in the corporation but are otherwise not involved in the business.

Owners send some general messages to managers through the stock market. If stockholders do not like what managers are doing, they sell their stocks, and the market value of the firm's stock drops. The representatives of stockholders on the firm's board of directors notice this and turn to the managers for corrective action. In this way, therefore, stock prices act like an oversight mechanism. They monitor the activities of managers by aggregating the opinions of the stockholders.

However, stock prices don't act fast enough. They don't give managers specific directions ahead of time about which projects to pursue and which to avoid. Managers must make these capital expenditure decisions on their own and then later find out, by the stock market's reaction, whether or not the firm's owners approve.

Disapproval can be costly. In the United States in 1992, for example, capital expenditures by the corporate business sector (excluding farming and finance) totaled $397 billion (or 6.6 percent of the annual gross domestic product). These expenditures usually cannot be recovered if stockholders disapprove of them.

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The Classic Solution

In view of this, capital budgeting has a central role in both the theory and the practice of managerial finance.

Theory suggests one simple nile for corporate managers to follow when making capital expenditure decisions: Maximize the value of the firm. Then, if some stockholders disagree with management decisions, they can sell their stock and be at least as well off as if management had made different decisions. This idea is the basis for the classic theoretical recommendation that managers only invest in those projects which have a positive net present value.

In practice, however, following that simple role is not simple. It requires, among other things, estimating the net present value of every project under consideration. Corporations thus spend a substantial amount of resources evaluating potential projects.

A key input to that process is the cost to the firm of financing capital expenditures, known more simply as the cost of capital. This is the expected rate of return that investors will require for investing in a specific project or financial asset. The cost of capital typically depends on the particular project and the risk associated with it. To be able to evaluate projects effectively, managers must understand how investors assess that risk and how they determine what risk premium to demand.

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The CAPM's Role

Providing such an understanding is the focus of most research in the area of asset pricing. An asset pricing model provides a method of assessing the riskiness of cash flows from a project. The model also provides an estimate of the relationship between that riskiness and the cost of capital (or the risk premium for investing in the project).

According to the CAPM, the only relevant measure of a project's risk is a variable unique to this model, known as the project's beta. In the CAPM, the cost of capital is an exact linear function of the rate on a risk-free project and the beta of the project being evaluated. A manager who has an estimate of the beta of a potential project can use the CAPM to estimate the cost of capital for the project.

If the CAPM captures investors' behavior adequately, then the historical data should reveal a positive linear relation between the average rerum on financial assets and their betas. Also, no other measure of risk should be able to explain the differences in average returns across financial assets that are not explained by CAPM betas. Empirical studies of the CAPM have supported tiffs model on both of those points -- recently, as the accompanying article describes.

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Table 2 Selected Stock Returns, Volatilities, and Betas During 1972-91 Relation to Total Portfolio[a] Effect on Portfolio Monthly Rate S.D. of $1 of Return Stock Increase Firm (i) Mean S.D. Beta (delta S/ (Ssj.) (Beta) deltax i American Telephone and Telegraph 1.19 5.36 .552 2.63Bristol-Myers Squibb 1.56 7.08 .986 4.70 Coca-Cola 1.40 6.75 .917 4.37Consolidated Edison 1.61 7.38 .566 2.70 Dayton Hudson 1.53 9.69 1.191 5.68 Digital Equipment 1.13 10.25 1.278 6.09 Exxon 1.47 5.26 .729 3.47 Ford Motor 1.15 8.32 .968 4.61International Business Machines .61 6.03 .769 3.66 McDonald's 1.37 8.15 1.129 5.38 McGraw-Hill 1.41 8.15 1.075 5.12

a The total portfolio is $1,000 invested in all stocks traded on the NYSE and AMEX.

Source: Center for Research on Security Prices, University of Chicago

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Table 3 Estimated Betas for Four Types of Assets During 1926-91 Stocks U.S. Treasury Period S&500 SmalIFirms Bonds Bills 1926-91 1.03 1.39 .07 .00 1926-75 1.03 1.44 .03 .00 1976-80 .94 1.46 .22 .00 1981-91 1.01 .99 .31 -.01

Source of basic data: Ibbotson Associates 1992

GRAPH: Chart 1: How the Value of $1 Invested in Four Assets Would Have Changed Since 1926

Source of basic data: Ibbotson Associates 1992

GRAPH: Chart 2: Beta of the Stock

GRAPH: Chart 3: Standard Deviation of the Stock Return

Source of basic data: Center for Research on Security Prices, University of Chicago

GRAPH: Chart 4: A Classic Test of the CAPM

Source: Black, Jensen, and Scholes 1972

GRAPH: Chart 5: Repeating a Classic Test of the CAPM

Source: Ibbotson Associates 1992

GRAPH: Chart 6: During 1926-75

GRAPH: Chart 7: During 1976-80

GRAPH: Chart 8: During 1981-91

Source of basic data: Ibbotson Associates 1992

GRAPH: Chart 9: A Standard One-Beta Model

GRAPH: Chart 10: A Model With Human Capital and Time-Varying Betas..

GRAPH: Chart 11: . . . And Firm Size

Source: Jagannathan and Wang, forthcoming (Figures 1, 3, and 4)

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References Amihud, Yakov; Christensen, Bent Jesper; and Mendelson, Haim. 1992. Further evidence on the risk-return relationship. Working Paper S-93-11. Salomon Brothers Center for the Study of Financial Institutions, Graduate School of Business Administration, New York University. Banz, Rolf W. 1981. The relationship between return and market value of common stocks. Journal of Financial Economics 9 (March): 3-18. Black, Fischer. 1972. Capital market equilibrium with restricted borrowing. Journal of Business 45 (July): 444-55. -----. 1993. Beta and return. Journal of Portfolio Management 20 (Fall): 8-18. Black, Fischer, Jensen, Michael C.; and Schules, Myron. 1972. The capital asset pricing model: Some empirical tests. In Studies in the theory of capital markets, ed. Michael Jensen, pp. 79-121. New York:: Praeger. Breen, William L and Korajczyk, Robert A. 1993. On selection biases in book-to-mar-ket based tests of asset pricing models. Working Paper 167. Northwestern University. Chari, V. V.; Jagannathan, Ravi; and Ofer, Aharon R. 1988. Seasonalities in security returns: The case of earnings announcements. Journal of Financial Economics 21 (May): 101-21. Fama, Eugene E, and French, Kenneth R. 1992. The cross-section of expected stock returns. Journal of Finance 47 (June): 427-65. -----. 1993. Common risk factors in the returns on bonds and stocks. Journal of Financial Economics 33 (Fcbrury): 3-56. Fama, Eugene E, and MacBeth, James D. 1973. Risk, return and equilibrium: Empirical tests. Journal of Political Economy 81 (May-June): 607-36. Ferson, Wayne E., and Harvey, Campbell R. 1991. The variation of economic risk premiums. Journal of Political Economy 99 (April): 385-415. -----. 1993. The risk and predictability of international equity returns. Review of Financial Studies 6 (3): 527--66. Ferson, Wayne E., and Korajczyk, Robert A. 1995. Do arbitrage pricing models explain the predictability of stock returns? Journal of Business 68 (July): 309-49. Gibbons, Michael R. 1982. Multivariate tests of financial models: A new approach. Journal of Financial Economics 10 (March): 3-27. Harvey, Campbell R. 1989. Time-varying conditional covariances in tests of asset pricing models. Journal of Financial Economics 24 (October): 289-317.Ibbotson Associates. 1992. Stocks, bonds, bills, and infiation--1992 yearbook. Chicag Ibbotson Associates. Jagannathan, Ravi, and Wang, Zhenyu. 1993. The CAPM is alive and well. Research Department Staff Report 165. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. -----. Forthcoming. The conditional CAPM and the cross-section of expected returns. Journal of Finance. Kothari, S. R; Shanken, Jay; and Sloan Richard G. 1995. Another look at the cross-section of expected stock returns. Journal of Finance 50 (March): 185-224. Lintner, John. 1965. The valuation of risk assets and the selection of risky investments in stock portfolios and capital budgets. Review of Economics and Statistics 47 (February): 13-37. Mackinlay, A. Craig, and Richardson, Matthew P. 1991. Using generalized method of moments to test mean-variance efficiency. Journal of Finance 46 (June): 511-27. Mayers, David. 1972. Nonmarketable assets and capital market equilibrium under uncertainty. In Studies in the theory of capital markets, ed. Michael Jensen, pp. 223-48. New York: Praeger. Shanken, Jay. 1985. Multivariate tests of the zero-beta CAPM. Journal of Financial Economics 14 (September): 327-48. -----. 1992. On the estimation of beta-pricing models. Review of Financial Studies 5 (1): 1-33. Shaspe, William F. 1964. Capital asset prices: A theory of market equilibrium under conditions of risk. Journal of Finance 19 (September): 425-42. Stambaugh, Robert E 1982. On the exclusion of assets from tests of the two-parameter model: A sensitivity analysis. Journal of Financial Economics 10 (November): 237-68.

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By Ravi Jagannathan, Visitor, Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis and Piper Jaffray Professor of Finance Carlson School of Management University of Minnesota and Ellen R. McGrattan, Senior Economist, Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis

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• What About the Data?

The Fama and French (1992) study has itself been challenged. The study's claims most attacked are these: that beta has no role for explaining cross-sectional variation in returns, that size has an important role, and that the book-to-market equity ratio has an important role. The studies responding to the Fama and French challenge generally take a closer look at the data used in that study.

Kothari, Shahken, and Sloan (1995) argue that Fama and French's (1992) findings depend critically on how one interprets their statistical tests. Kothari, Shanken, and Sloan focus on Fama and French's estimates for the coefficient on beta [gamma1 in equation (15)], which have high standard errors and therefore imply that a wide range of economically plausible risk premiums cannot be rejected statistically. For example, if the estimate of gamma1 is 0.24 percent per month with a standard error of 0.23 percent, then 0 and 50 basis points per month are both statistically plausible.[7]

This view, that the data are too noisy to invalidate the CAPM, is supported by Amihud, Christensen, and Mendelson (1992) and Black (1993). In fact, Amihud, Christensen, and Mendelson (1992) find that when a more efficient statistical method is used, the estimated relation between average return and beta is positive and significant.

Black (1993) suggests that the size effect noted by Banz (1981) could simply be a sample period effect: the size effect is observed in some periods and not in others. To make his point, Black uses some findings of Fama and French (1992). They find that their estimate of gama1 in equation (16) is not significantly different from zero for the 1981-90 period. That is, size does not appear to have any power to explain cross-sectional variation in average returns for the period after the Banz (1981) paper was published. This point is also evident in our data in Table 1. In the 1981-91 subperiod, the return on small-firm stocks was 13.3 percent whereas that on the S& 500 stocks was 15.7 percent.

One aspect of Fama and French's (1992) result is troubling. Although their point estimate for the coefficient on beta (gamma1) for the 1981-90 sample is statistically significant, it is negative rather than positive, as the CAPM predicts risk premiums to be. This is evidence against the CAPM, but also evidence in favor of the view that the size effect may be spurious and period-specific.

Even if there is a size effect, however, there is still a question about its importance given the relatively small value of small finns, as a group, used in these studies. Jagannathan and Wang (1993) report the average market value of firms in each of 100 groups. Finns in the largest 40 percent of the groups account for more than 90 percent of the market value of all stocks on the NYSE and AMEX. Thus, for a large enough collection of assets, the CAPM may still be empirically valid.

Another variable that Fama and French (1992) find to be important for explaining cross-sectional variation in returns is the ratio of book-to-market equity. However, Kothari, Shanken, and Sloan (1995) point to another problem with the data (from Compustat) used by Fama and French (1992).[8] The problem is the treatment of firms that are added to the data set and then their data are back-filled by Compustat. Firms that had a high ratio of book-to-market equity early in the sample were less likely to survive and less likely to be included by Compustat. Those that did survive and were added later show high returns. Thus, the procedure has a potential bias. Breen and Korajczyk (1993) follow up on this conjecture by using a Compustat sample that has the same set of firms for all years; no back-filled data are used. They find that the effect of the book-to-market equity ratio is much weaker in these data than that reported by Fama and French (1992).[9]

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